OPINIÓN MORAL.CRÍTICA DE "LA TEORÍA DEL PAISAJE ECONÓMICO", Y LOS PROBLEMAS DE MEDICIÓN OBJETIVA DE "LA ECONOMÍA ESTETIZADA/IDEOLOGIZADA". DISCURSO PÚBLICO.

OPINIÓN MORAL.

CRÍTICA DE "LA TEORÍA DEL PAISAJE ECONÓMICO", Y LOS PROBLEMAS DE MEDICIÓN OBJETIVA DE "LA ECONOMÍA ESTETIZADA/IDEOLOGIZADA".

DISCURSO PÚBLICO.

POR, DISAR DELHERBE.

DIRECTOR EJECUTIVO, BLOG FEMINISMO-CONSERVADOR/CONSERVATOR-FEMINISM.

ÍNDICE.

1.- LA "TEORÍA DEL PAISAJE ECONÓMICO", EL "DINERO DIGNO DE CONVERTIRSE EN UTILIDADES", Y LA HIPÓTESIS DEL PARÁMETRO MORAL DE LA DISPOSICIÓN A PAGAR.

2.- LA DISCRIMINACIÓN DE PRECIOS Y LA REDUCCIÓN DE LAS LÓGICAS MONOPÓLICAS EN TÉRMINOS DE LA CRÍTICA DE LA CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL. LA IRRACCIONALIDAD DEL VALOR TIE-IN/LA "FALSA SUBSTITUCIÓN".

3.- ANÁLISIS ECONÓMICO DE LA NORMATIVIDAD PÚBLICA ANALOGADA AL MONOPOLIO REGULADO SEGÚN LA DISCRIMINACIÓN DE PRECIOS.

4.- LOS VALORES SOCIOLÓGICOS LEGALES OPTIMIZADOS CON EL ÓPTIMO DE PARETO DEBERÍAN SER ENTENDIDOS EN TÉRMINOS UNIVERSALES.

NOTAS.

THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK.

ESTA PÁGINA HA SIDO INTENCIONALMENTE DEJADA EN BLANCO.

THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK.

ESTA PÁGINA HA SIDO INTENCIONALMENTE DEJADA EN BLANCO.

1.- LA "TEORÍA DEL PAISAJE ECONÓMICO", EL "DINERO DIGNO DE CONVERTIRSE EN UTILIDADES", Y LA HIPÓTESIS DEL PARÁMETRO MORAL DE LA DISPOSICIÓN A PAGAR.

TRADUCCIÓN,

"Landscape Economics

Second Edition", 1978 - 2017, 

palgrave mcmillan

CHAPTER-8,

"Cost–Benefit Analysis and Willingness to Pay for 

Landscape"

PAG-137 - PAG-146

https://drive.google.com/file/d/1mWhfB_e3HiViiPSsYCDggzxjIQ46_S6c/view?usp=drivesdk

RESUMEN EJECUTIVO,

LAS IDEAS FORMULADAS EN ESTE LIBRO ILUSTRAN LA PROBLEMÁTICA DE LA CRÍTICA DE CONVERTIR "DINERO DIGNO" EN UTILIDADES, O TRABAJO EN LA DIRECCIÓN OPUESTA DE LOS VALORES EN UTILIDADES POR LA EQUIVALENCIA DE DINERO, CRITICANDO, POR LO TANTO, LA IDEA DE LA MEDICIÓN DE "UNA TEORÍA DE PRECIOS SOCIALES" EN TÉRMINOS LIBERALES, ES DECIR, UNA IDEA DEL ANÁLISIS COSTO BENEFICIO EN TÉRMINOS SOCIALES NO-IDEOLOGIZADOS.

LA JUSTIFICACIÓN, POR LO TANTO, DE USAR EL VALOR DE LA DISPOSICIÓN A PAGAR WTP/DAP ES CONTROVERSIAL, DUDANDO ALGUNOS ECONOMISTAS DE LA VALIDEZ DE LAS ESCALAS DE UTILIDAD CARDINAL; PERO ILUSTRADO EN SIMPLE, LA PROPORCIONALIDAD DE LA UTILIDAD MARGINAL Y LA WTP/DAP PUEDEN SER DERIVARADAS POR ASUMIRSE LA RACIONALIDAD DE LOS CONSUMIDORES.

(..)Willingness to Pay as the Value Measure(..)

(..)At a stroke, WTP seems to resolve major problems encountered in previous chapters: replacing unrepresentative expert evaluation, it democratically allows all consumers to express their opinion of worth. By providing a common, monetary unit of value, it enables comparisons to be made between landscape values, fnancial outlays, and any other kind of value(..)

(..)In addition, when other methods of reaching a cardinal scale are unavailable or deemed untrustworthy, units of WTP arguably define a constant value interval.

Moreover, summing net WTP for a project allows comparison of all 

options, at the same time, on a common basis, avoiding political machinations to favour one alternative over others(..)

(..)The only relevant consideration is whether it is easier to convert moneysworth into utils, or to work in the opposite direction, from whatever values are measured directly in utils (usually, none) to money equivalents. The latter involves less work, but, barring miscalculation, the two 

approaches give the same answer(..)

(..)But such a central precept—that WTP money measures benefit—is controversial and needs justifcation. Some welfare economists have doubted the validity of cardinal utility scales (Little 1957); but, in a simple way, the proportionality of marginal utility and WTP can be derived by assuming consumers’ rationality(..)

(..)If consumers actually pay as much for benefts as they are willing to 

pay, there is no redistributional efect; (nor, obversely, if they are exactly 

compensated for disbenefts). Their utility has neither increased nor 

decreased. Change of benefit is then measured as a gain to the recipients

or providers of payments, whose own income determines the relevant 

utility weight. Since full exactment of WTP or actual compensation is 

rare, there are almost invariably changes in consumer’s surplus, to which it is appropriate to attach consumers’ utility weights(..)

(..)Cost–Beneft Analysis and the Social Value of Resources(..)

In a perfectly-ordered world, prices refect social value, and economic 

analysis may be based on them. In reality, economies are far from opti-

mal. Governments wish to change employment level, infation rate, balance of payments and balance of budget, income distribution and balance between investment and consumption; but are prevented from completely achieving their objectives for reasons beyond their control. 

Hence the state of the wider economy infuences the real cost to society of using resources for landscape projects.

In social CBA, not only opportunity cost, but distributional efects 

of income and expenditure were included in “social prices” (Little and 

Mirrlees 1974; Squire and van der Tak 1975; UK Treasury, undated). 

To labour’s opportunity cost might be added the gain or loss in welfare 

resulting with transfer of funds from government or other employer to 

workers (often assumed to be impoverished). Value of wages accorded with the computed utility of income, across the range from without-project earning to with-project earning. Money in the hands of government (as project agency or bystander) was ascribed a premium, as it gave government the means to pursue many economic and social objectives, including vital investment for economic growth.

2.- LA DISCRIMINACIÓN DE PRECIOS Y LA REDUCCIÓN DE LAS LÓGICAS MONOPÓLICAS EN TÉRMINOS DE LA CRÍTICA DE LA CHICAGO LAW SCHOOL. LA IRRACCIONALIDAD DEL VALOR TIE-IN/LA "FALSA SUBSTITUCIÓN".

RICHARD A. POSNER, ACADÉMICO Y EX JUEZ NOS ILUSTRA EN EL PAPER,

"THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OF

ANTITRUST ANALYSIS", 1978, 

https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles/1814/

LA TAUTOLOGÍA DE LA "FALSA SUBSTITUCIÓN" DE BIENES EN TÉRMINOS DE LA POLÍTICA ANTITRUST, DENOMINADA TIE-IN, DONDE "SE REQUIERE UN COMPRADOR QUE COMPRE UN SEGUNDO PRODUCTO COMO CONDICIÓN DE COMPRAR EL PRIMER PRODUCTO"(Ver Nota-1)

NO SE CONSIDERA UN MÉTODO RACIONAL DE OBTENCIÓN DE UNA SEGUNDA FUENTE DE BENEFICIOS MONOPÓLICOS, PORQUE UN INCREMENTO EN EL PRECIO CARGADO POR EL PRODUCTO TIE-IN([LA "FALSA SUBSTITUCIÓN"]) VA A HACER, QUE COMO PRIMERA APROXIMACIÓN SE REDUZCA EL PRECIO QUE EL COMPRADOR ESTÁ QUERIENDO PAGAR POR EL PRODUCTO FALSAMENTE SUBSTITUÍDO - EN EL CASO QUE PUDIESE PRODUCIR LA "FALSA SUBSTITUCIÓN", AGREGAMOS.

LA CONVERGENCIA ENTRE LA "OPINIÓN CHICAGO" Y LA "OPINIÓN HARVARD" CONSTITUYE PRINCIPALMENTE LA IDEA DE QUE LA DISCRIMINACIÓN DE PRECIOS EXTERNALIZA FACTORES DE LA PRODUCCIÓN LOS CUALES ADOLECEN DE SUPERVISIÓN, AUNQUE PERMITIENDO SU PRODUCCIÓN, PERO IMPLICANDO UNA REFORMULACIÓN INFORMAL DEL PRECIO ENTRE EL ACTO  INTERMEDIARIO DE SU PRODUCCIÓN, EL CONSUMIDOR FINAL, AUMENTANDO LAS BARRERAS-DE-ENTRADA, MANTENIENDO LA EMPRESA FUENTE DE "FALSA SUBSTITUCIÓN".

GUBERNAMENTALMENTE, TRADUCIDO - AGREGAMOS - ESTO ES POR SUPUESTO CORRUPCIÓN POLÍTICA.

(..)The use of the term "Chicago" to describe a body of antitrust views to which I, among others, am thought to subscribe is very common. I shall argue in this paper that although there was a time when the "Chicago" school stood for a distinctive approach to antitrust policy, especially in regard to economic questions, and when other schools, particularly a "Harvard" school, could be discerned and contrasted with it, the distinctions between these schools have greatly diminished. This has occurred largely as a result of the maturing of economics as a social science, and, as a corollary thereto, the waning of the sort of industrial organization that provided the intellectual foundations of the Harvard school(..)

(..)More generally, this change can be attributed to the fact that the diversity in fundamental premises among economists studying antitrust questions has substantially diminished. No longer is it such a simple thing to identify a Harvard or a Chicago position on issues of anti-

trust policy. Partly this is a matter of growing consensus; partly of a shift from disagreement over basic premises, methodology, and ideology toward technical disagreements of the sort that would be found even in a totally nonideological field(..)

(..)A tie-in (i.e., requiring a buyer to buy a second product as the condition of buying the first) is not a rational method of obtaining a second source of monopoly profits, because an increase in the price charged for the tied product will, as a first approximation, reduce the price that the purchaser is willing to pay for the tying product. A tie-in makes sense only as a method of price discrimination, based on the fact that the amount of the tied product bought can be used to separate purchasers into more or less elastic demanders of the tying product. There is no need to worry about price discrimination, however, because it does not aggravate the monopoly problem. On the contrary, price discrimination is a device by which the monopolist in effect seeks to serve additional consumers, i.e., those having the more elastic demands, who might be deterred by the single monopoly price that would be charged in the absence of discrimination. Thus, price discrimination brings the monopolist's output closer to that of a competitive market and reduces the misallocative effects of monopoly.

(..)THE GROWING CONVERGENCE OF THE TWO SCHOOLS(..)

(..)The basic tenet of the Chicago school, that problems of competition and monopoly should be analyzed using the tools of general economic theory rather than those of traditional industrial organization, has triumphed. The concepts and methods of traditional industrial organization are increasingly discredited in economics as practiced in the leading universities and this change is beginning to be reflected in the application of economics to antitrust law. The new Areeda and Turner treatise is a notable example of this point, although the treatise, perhaps because it is addressed primarily to practitioners rather than scholars, does not explicitly acknowledge the modification or abandonment of many of Professor Turner's earlier views. At the same time, the application of price theory to antitrust law has not left the pioneering work of Director and his followers untouched.

Let us consider now how the passage of years has affected some

of the specific controversies between the Chicago and Harvard schools(..)

(..)1. Tie-ins. The leverage theory of tie-ins early gave way in Harvard thinking to a barriers-to-entry theory. A tie-in was said to complicate entry because the new entrant would have to produce the tied as well as the tying product. When the motive for

tying is price discrimination, however, the producer of the tying product need not assume control over any part of the production of the tied product, let alone produce it all. Instead, all that is required is that he act as an intermediary between the producer and the ultimate consumer so that he can reprice it in accordance with his discriminatory scheme. A new entrant will be able to obtain the tied product from the same source that the existing firm obtains it from.

3.- ANÁLISIS ECONÓMICO DE LA NORMATIVIDAD PÚBLICA ANALOGADA AL MONOPOLIO REGULADO SEGÚN LA DISCRIMINACIÓN DE PRECIOS.

SI ES QUE VALORÁSEMOS LAS CONTROVERSIAS GUBERNAMENTALES EN TÉRMINOS DE LA DISCRIMINACIÓN DE PRECIOS AFECTANDO EL PODER MONOPÓLICO, IMPLICARÍA EN LOS TÉRMINOS DE POSNER QUE UNA POSICIÓN CONSERVADORA ACERCA DE LA NORMATIVIDAD DE INTERÉS PÚBLICO SERÍA UN INCENTIVO AL MONOPOLISTA PARA BUSCAR OPTIMIZAR TAL NORMATIVIDAD, ASUNTO QUE COMPARATIVAMENTE EN EL CASO DEL MONOPOLISTA SE TRADUCE EN QUERER ATENDER A CONSUMIDORES ADICIONALES, QUE TIENEN UNA DEMANDA MÁS ELÁSTICA, LO CUAL DEBERÍA SUCEDER POR UN BALANCE DE LA MODIFICACIÓN DEL PRECIO INICIAL HACIA UN PRECIO MÁS COMPETITIVO. 

4.- LOS VALORES SOCIOLÓGICOS LEGALES OPTIMIZADOS CON EL ÓPTIMO DE PARETO DEBERÍAN SER ENTENDIDOS EN TÉRMINOS UNIVERSALES.

EN TÉRMINOS DE "LA TRADUCCIÓN" DEL PRECIO COMPETITIVO PARA EL MONOPOLIO IMPLICADO DESDE LA DISCRIMINACIÓN DE PRECIOS, BUSCANDO OPTIMIZAR EL VALOR MORAL DE LA NORMATIVIDAD PÚBLICA EN TÉRMINOS DE UNA GOBERNABILIDAD MÁS PLURALISTA, EN TÉRMINOS MORALES, EL TEOREMA DE PARETO DEBERÍA PERMITIR CUANTIFICAR EL INCREMENTO DE LA MAXIMIZACIÓN DE UTILIDAD, DE LA NORMATIVIDAD PÚBLICA CONTROVERSIAL CONTINGENTE, IMPLICANDO QUE TAL NORMATIVIDAD IMPLIQUE UNA MAYOR SATISFACCIÓN DE LA SUMATORIA DE LAS UTILIDADES QUE ES OBJETO DE LA REGULACIÓN, EN TÉRMINOS, PRECISAMENTE DE PARETO, PORQUE LA NORMA SERÍA MÁS COMPETITIVA EN TÉRMINOS MORALES SI ES QUE IMPLICA, OPTIMIZAR UN VALOR QUE SIENDO OBJETO DE CONTROVERSIAS CONSTITUTE UN VALOR UNIVERSAL QUE ESTÉ AFECTANDO EL FUNCIONAMIENTO DE LA NORMA, POR EJEMPLO LA MEDICIÓN DE LA IDEA DE "LA VIDA BUENA"/"THE GOOD LIFE" POR PARTE DE LA OECD(Ver Nota-2) BUSCANDO SUPERAR LAS IDEAS SEXISTAS APLICANDO CRITERIOS DISEÑADOS PARA LA MEDICIÓN DE CLASE SOCIAL PROPIOS DE LAS MUJERES A LOS HOMBRES, POR IGUAL.

FINALMENTE, EN EL MISMO SENTIDO, LA CUANTIFICACIÓN DEL COSTO BENEFICIO DE LA VIDA DE LOS ADULTOS MAYORES EN TÉRMINOS DE LA CUANTIFICACIÓN DE SU DEMANDA INELÁSTICA EN CUANTO AL CÁLCULO DE LOS VALORES MONETARIOS EN PENSIONES DESDE LA MEDICIÓN SIMPLEMENTE ESTADÍSTICA DE LA VIDA SEGÚN LA APROXIMACIÓN DE LOS AÑOS-DE-VIDA QUE NO ES PRECISAMENTE COHERENTE CON LA IDEA DE "LA UTILIDAD DE LA VIDA" DE UNA PERSONA MAYOR EN CONTRASTE A UNA PERSONA MÁS JOVEN, EN EL CASO DE FATALIDAD, DONDE UNA PERSONA MÁS JOVEN, "PIERDE MÁS UTILIDAD DE VIDA" QUE LA PERSONA MAYOR, ENTENDIENDO QUE POR LO TANTO, COMPARATIVAMENTE LA REGULACION DEL OZONO A PROPÓSITO DEL SMOG IMPLICA EN EL MISMO SENTIDO COSTOS QUE CONSTITUYEN OBJECCIONES INOBJETABLES EN TÉRMINOS DE PARETO, LAS CUALES ESTÁN NORMATIVIZADAS, EN TODO CASO, POR LA "Clean Air Act", DESDE LA Environmental Protection Agency, EPA, EN UNITED STATES.

(Ver Nota-3)

TE ENVÍO UN CORDIAL SALUDO,

DISAR DELHERBE.

EQUIPO FEMINISMO-CONSERVADOR.

NOTAS

NOTA-1

EN CUALQUIER CASO, TAL PRESUPOSICIÓN TIE-IN YA LA HABÍA FORMULADO EN MAYO DE 1969 YALE BROZEN, EN EL MISMO SENTIDO QUE SEÑALAMOS ANTERIORMENTE, PARA LA MISMA UNIVERSIDAD, SEÑALADA  EN EL PAPER,

"Do Antitrust Efforts Encourage Monopoly?"

/"¿Los Esfuerzos Antitrust Enfrentan el Monopolio?"

05/01/1969

https://www.chicagobooth.edu/review/do-antitrust-efforts-encourage-monopoly

SEÑALANDO LA ASOCIACIÓN ENTRE LO ANTITRUST Y EL ESTATUS DE MONOPOLIO NATURAL, DE MONOPOLISTA NATURAL, EN TÉRMINOS DE LA CONCENTRACIÓN DE LA PRODUCCIÓN PARA EFECTOS COMPETITIVOS VALORANDO EN TODO CASO EL TARGET DEL EXPEDIENTE LEGAL,

United States v. Alcoa, 1945, QUE COINCIDE CON LAS DECISIONES DE LAS CORTES DE POR AQUÉL TIEMPO.

(..)If it happens that the most efficient producer operating at his most economic scale can supply the entire market, competition concentrates production in the hands of one firm. This the textbooks call “natural monopoly.” The courts may designate this as legal under the antitrust laws because the “monopoly” status was thrust upon the natural “monopolist.” Reading some of the language of decisions of recent years, however, beginning with Judge Learned Hand’s in the Alcoa case (United States v. Alcoa, 1945), I am dubious that a single seller could succeed in defending himself on these grounds unless he met certain tests(..)

NOTA-2

EL LIBRO,

"Women's Social Standing 

The Empirical Problem of Female 

Social Class", 1943 - 1992.

Palgrave Macmillan.

PART II CONSTRUCTING A SOCIAL CLASSIFICATION 

FOR WOMEN

CHAPTER-7,

"Measuring Female Life Chances: The Variables and the Data".

SUBCHAPTER-7,

"Measuring the Good Life".

PAG-68 - PAG-69

https://drive.google.com/file/d/1m_o9gigy93RLd-td296Dcz3PX4aICxyB/view?usp=drivesdk

(..)The demonstration that 'occupational class' does not work very well in a certain context or is counter-intuitive ought to concern proponents of that index but is not a definitive refutation of its value. We have to provide a test: not only in terms of the relative power of indices in discriminating a specific outcome (like death) but also in terms of the range of valued outcomes which can be discriminated by each of the different indices. To do this we need to known what an index of social status is meant to be discriminating before judging whether a proposed index is or is not adequate. In other words, the objective of the proposed index should be clarified: what are the (female) life chances between which an index of social status should be capable of discriminating?(..)

(..)In general, stratification theorists would expect their social-class index to discriminate power, prestige and wealth. In a 'just', though unequal, 

society, there is no theoretical reason why social classness should distin-

guish between the average life expectancies of different groups, the access of their children to education, the availability of adequate housing and other 'socially necessary minima' for citizenship (Mack and Lansley, 1987)(..)

(..)In 'modem industrialised societies', however, social status tends to discriminate not only power, prestige and wealth but nearly every other component of basic needs (including life expectancy, access to education and adequate housing). According to custom, practice and, sadly, reality, the social class 

measure is therefore expected to discriminate nearly nearly all elements of the good life(..)

(..)Most recent discussions of how to measure the quality oflife (OECD, 1976; Miles, 1985) would include not only healthfulness of life but also other aspects of human development such as attained knowledge, the quality of human activities and of their environment, freedom, human rights and justice. Those discussions have been general - unspecific to gender or to national context - but here an attempt is made to draw up a series of criterial or outcome measures which are appropriate for adult women in post-war British society. By 'appropriate', we mean a set of measures which not only reflects the quality of life which they lead but also where we would be concerned if the quality of life so measured were socially differentiated(..)

(..)The general scope of quality of life measures includes attained knowl-

edge, the quality of human activities and of their environment, freedom, 

human rights and justice. But a practical specification for adults in post-war British society ought also to include the prospects for satisfying/happy social relationships with another adult; and, where there are children, that they are themselves healthy and have good life chances. Parsons (1956) might argue that these considerations are only pertinent/relevant for women, 

but we would argue that this is either gratuitiously sexist or wrong(..)

NOTA-3

"How Cost-Benefit Analysis Can 

Better Protect the Environment 

and Our Health", 1958 - 2008.

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS.

PART II Eight Fallacies of Cost-Benefit Analysis

Fallacy 3: Older People Are Less Valuable

PAG-77 - PAG-78

https://drive.google.com/file/d/1mf_EnyPSWTj981xj6rOy07NTwCUGp5cd/view?usp=drivesdk

(..)Regulations save lives. When decisionmakers ask whether a particular regulation is justified, they are often swayed by the number of lives it saves. How they measure the benefit of a saved life, then, is critical. The standard way to measure the benefit of a saved life is to look at people’s willingness to pay to avoid health and safety risks, which is then used to estimate the value of a statistical life(..)

(..)Recently there have been efforts to substitute the value of life-years for the value of statistical life. Use of life-years, however, leads to the third fallacy in cost-benefit analysis—that older people are less valuable than younger people, in proportion to their life expectancies(..)

(..)Under the life-years methodology, because younger people will on average lose more life years when they die, their lives are assigned a much greater value—the life of a 40-year-old is seven times more valuable than that of a 70-year-old. This outcome is both inconsistent with economic theory and flatly contradicted by empirical data on how people value risk(..)

(..)The origin of the life-years approach is typically traced to an article by Michael J. Moore and W. Kip Viscusi entitled The Quantity-Adjusted Value of Life.? In that study, Moore and Viscusi introduced the idea that the value of a statistical life “cannot be divorced from the duration of life involved since lives are extended, not permanently saved.” They argued that “in the case of fatalities, a young person loses a much greater amount of lifetime utility than does an older person(..)

(..)Proponents of the life-years method use a constant pet life-year value, so that all life-years are valued equally no matter when they occur during the life cycle. They derive that number by taking the value of a statistical life and dividing it by the average life expectancy of the subjects of wage-risk studies(..)

(..)The application of a constant per life-year value across the life cycle results in smaller values being assigned to the elderly or the unhealthy. For example, using a $180,000 life-year value, the life of an elderly (or unhealthy) individual with a remaining life expectancy of five years would be valued at $900,000(..)

(..)Therefore, under the life-years approach, the value assigned to the 

life of the elderly individual would be only one-seventh the $6.3 million 

valued assigned to an individual of average age(..)

(..)WHY IT’S BAD: THE CASE OF SMOG(..)

(..)To illustrate the contrast between the statistical life and the life-years methods, consider it in the context of ground-level ozone regulation. Ground-level ozone, commonly known as smog, leads to many terrible respiratory conditions, including asthma, permanent lung damage, and death(..)

(..)Besides these health effects, it also has negative environmental effects, including harm to plant life and decreased visibility. For these reasons, ozone levels have been regulated since 1970. Under the Clean Air Act, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) sets permissible ozone levels(..)

(..)The agency is required to review these levels on a periodic basis to keep them current with developing science. At this writing, the EPA is conducting such a review. Several studies since the last review in 1996 have shown that the harm of short-term exposure to ozone has been underestimated. New data on the effects of ozone exposure on, in the jargon of the EPA, “additional respiratory-related endpoints, newly identified cardiovascular-related health endpoints, and mortality,” have caused the staff of EPA to recommend consideration of a stricter standard that would require a lower level of ozone(..)

(..)Regulating ozone has not been easy. Ground-level ozone is generally created through a chemical reaction in which volatile organic compounds 

and nitrogen oxides mix in the presence of sunlight. These compounds have myriad sources, including motor vehicle exhaust and gasoline vapors(..)

(..)Controlling the pollution associated with automobiles is famously difficult. 

Although pollution per mile driven has fallen in the last thirty years, the 

number of miles driven has risen,” leaving ozone levels dangerously high in many parts of the country.’' Engineering solutions to these problems have been scarce and costly(..)

LAS OBJECCIONES INOBJETABLES A EFECTOS DE CORROBORAR LA ESTRUCTURA DE FALACIAS QUE SUPERAN EL ANÁLISIS COSTO BENEFICIO, QUE ILUSTRAMOS ANTERIORMENTE, NOS PARECE LO TEMATIZA ADECUADAMENTE, HOWARD F. CHANG, DE LA YALE UNIVERSITY, EN EL PAPER,

"A Liberal Theory of Social Welfare: Fairness, Utility, and the Pareto Principle", 2000.

https://www.yalelawjournal.org/author/howard-f-chang

https://openyls.law.yale.edu/handle/20.500.13051/9332?show=full